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There is statistical evidence that decisions to participate in CRP and work off-farm are made 
simultaneously. Characteristics of households, farm operations other farm programs, and the 
local economies affect both decisions; some factors affect only one. Policy changes that affect 
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  1Are Farmers’ Decisions to Work off the Farm and Participate in the Conservation Reserve 
Program Independent, Joint or Sequential? 
 
Hung-Hao Chang and Richard N. Boisvert 
Background 
It is now widely accepted that agricultural policy analysis must recognize the diverse 
nature of farms and the increasing interconnection between the farm business and farm 
household (Offutt, 2002). Labor has been released from agriculture through adoption of 
agricultural technology, and steady long-term economic growth has also pulled labor off farms. 
The dependence of households remaining in farming on income from non-farm sources has also 
increased steadily, narrowing, or actually reversing, the gap between the incomes of farm and 
non-farm households. The agricultural sector has also become more heterogeneous. 
It is only recently, through the conservation compliance provisions of the 1985 farm bill, 
that environmental goals were elevated along side commodity policy objectives. The number of 
provisions offering farmers incentives to participate in environmentally related programs has 
increased, with overall spending to rise by 80% under the new farm legislation—to a 10-year 
total of $38.6 billion. The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the largest program targeting 
land use, pays farmers $2 billion / year to remove 34 million acres from agricultural production.  
The potential contribution of both off-farm employment and government incentives to 
participate in environmentally related programs to farm household income and income stability 
may be increasingly significant as commodity-related sources of farm income support are 
reduced and farmers are exposed to greater market price risk. Decisions to participate in either of 
these activities lead to reductions in farm household resources committed to agricultural 
production. It is reasonable to hypothesize that these decisions are interrelated. If this is the case, 
policy implications derived from models that consider them as independent may be misleading.  
  2This paper investigates the extent to which these two decisions by farm households are 
made independently, are simultaneous, or are determined sequentially. We are interested in how 
these decisions to work off the farm and participate in the CRP depend on the stock of human 
capital and risk attitudes of farm operators, as well as the composition of farm household income 
and wealth. It is also critical to identify how these decisions differ by region and how they are 
affected by land quality, farm size, and participation in other government programs.  
To motivate the empirical model specification, we develop an agricultural household 
production model. Data for the empirical analysis come primarily from the 2001 annual 
Agricultural Research Management Survey (ARMS) conducted by the USDA. 
We specify econometric models reflecting both the simultaneous and sequential decision 
hypotheses and develop a series of tests to choose among the models. The simultaneous decision 
hypothesis is reflected in multinomial logit and bivariate probit choice models. A nested 
multinomial logit model (NLM) is frequently used to model sequential choices, but it is not 
suitable in this application where characteristics of the farm households in the sample differ, but 
the characteristics of the choices available do not. For statistical identification, it is necessary to 
normalize on one of the choices, resulting in a loss of information. We take an alternative 
approach, which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been used to model sequential decisions 
such as those of interest here. We specify a model that combines the strengths of both an 
endogenous switching regression model and a bivariate probit model. It is similar to the 
sequential probit model proposed by Amemiya (1985) and applied by Tunali (1986).  As with 
Tunali’s models, our model allows for correlation between the two sequential choices. In 
addition, there are fully observed regimes in our model. 
 
  3Theoretical Framework 
To focus on the essence of this combined choice, we assume that all decisions are made 
by the farm operator.
1 There are fixed endowments of time (E ) and of farmland ( A). Time is 
allocated to leisure (l), farm production (L), and off-farm work (Lm). The household receives 
income from several sources: agricultural product sales, off-farm work at an off-farm wage (w), 
CRP per acre payments (Pe), and decoupled farm payments (M). Land is allocated between crop 
production (A), and  CRP (Ae). Utility depends not only on farm household consumption (x) and 
leisure (l), but also the improvement in environmental quality (e) generated by land in CRP.  
Agricultural output, y, depends on land and labor, where y = F (L, A) is a well-behaved 
concave production function. We assume that the commodity price, P, is random; η + = P P , 
where P  is the expected price and the random error follows an arbitrary distribution ( η~(0, 
)). Production risk is reflected by: 
2
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The agricultural household maximizes expected utility, subject to a full income constraint, 
a time constraint, and an acreage constraint: 
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1 While the presence of a spouse and children conditions the farmer’s decisions, we abstract from complications 
associated with work on and off the farm by family members.  
  4We rewrite the problem by eliminating l and x through substitution of equations (2 
through 4) into equation (1). The choice variables are land in CRP (Ae), labor in off-farm work 
(Lm), and labor used for agricultural production (L): 
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where Ui is the first-order derivative of the utility function with respect to argument i. The 
optimal levels of (Ae, Lm, L) for the agricultural household are given by the simultaneous 
solution of equations (6), (7), and (8). From equation (7), labor is allocated to off-farm work until 
the ratio of the expected marginal utility of leisure to the expected marginal utility of 
consumption is equal to the off-farm wage (w).  
To interpret the other first-order conditions, we take the expectations of both equations (6) 
and (8). In doing so, the first term of equation (6) can be expanded into: 
(9)  ) ( )] ( ) ( [ )] ( ) ( [ x e x A x A x A x A U E P U E g U E f U E g U E f P − + + + εη η ε  
By taking expectations and applying the appropriate approximation (Bohrnstedt and 
Goldberger 1969), then substituting these expressions for expected values and covariances into 
equations (6) and (8), the first-order necessary conditions are now: 
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The optimality conditions for the levels of CRP area, equation (10), and labor for 
production, equation (11), are more complex, compared with standard farm-household 
production models, because optimal decisions depend on the covariance of the expected 
marginal utility with each source of risk, covariances of the random variables of different sources 
of risk sources, expected marginal utility, and risk characteristics of farm inputs.  
From equation (10), land is allocated to CRP up to the point where the expected marginal 
utility of the CRP payment, plus the marginal utility of CRP land’s contribution to the 
environment, is equal to the risk adjusted utility of the value of the marginal production forgone. 
The optimal CRP acreage is not necessary less than in the risk neutral case, and this result 
depends not only on the risk characteristics of land in production and the covariance between 
marginal utility and the two elements of risk, but also the covariance term between the two 
components of risk ( ) (ηε Cov ). If land is risk increasing, land in CRP is still possibly lower than 
under risk neutrally if the covariance between the risk factors is high.
2  
From equation (11), labor is employed in agriculture up to where the marginal utility of 
the risk adjusted marginal product of labor is equal to the marginal utility of leisure. From 
equation (7), the marginal utility of leisure is equal to off-farm wages.  
 
                                                 
2 We have: ) ( ) ( ) ( ) )( ( ε η ε ε η g f g P x E A P wL g f P x e e m + + + = + + + + = .Assume  0 > ε g  and  ε g f + >  0, then if 
0 > η  we know that  . Under risk aversion, U’(x) < U’(E(x)), therefore, Cov (U ) (x E x > x’,η ) < 0. The same 
argument is applied to determine that Cov (Ux’,ε ) < 0 and Cov (Ux’, u) > 0. 
 
  6Econometric Framework 
The primary objective of this study is to determine the decision making process that 
underlies the off-farm labor supply of farm households and participation in CRP. To avoid the 
misspecification of the econometric selection model, we propose several econometric strategies 
to characterize these decisions. We compare the performance of two econometric structures that 
embody a joint decision process against one that embodies a sequential decision process.  
 Joint Choice Structure  
When decisions are considered joint, polychotomous choice models are commonly used 
in empirical analysis. These models fall into two classes. The first relies on multiple binary 
choice rules, defining each decision separately as a binary choice, but allowing for the 
correlation between these decisions. If the correlation proves significant, the decisions are truly 
jointly determined; otherwise they can be regarded more simply as separate choices. This forms 
the basis for testing whether the multiple choices should be regarded as independent or joint. If a 
joint normal distribution is assumed, a bivariate probit model is appropriate to consider the joint 
decisions between CRP participation and off-farm work.    
The second class is the multinomial discrete choice model, based on a random utility 
framework (McFadden (1974); Dubin and McFadden (1984); Lee (1983)). Here, the decisions 
are considered to be joint, without the possibility that each choice could be made separately. If 
the error term is assumed to have a Type I extreme value distribution, we have the multinomial 
logit model by McFadden (1974).
3 Regarding model selection, in the case of participation in 
CRP and/or off-farm work, there are four distinct regimes—participate in: CRP only, off-farm 
work only, both CRP and off-farm work, and neither. 
                                                 
3 Theil (1969) originally studied the choice of transportation mode; Barham et al. (2002) studied the adoption of 
rBST on U.S. dairy farms.    
  7Bivariate Probit Choice  
According to this choice model, the CRP participation decision is determined by the 
reservation per acre return (perhaps risk adjusted) to the farmer of retaining the land in 
production with the government’s payment for land in the conservation reserve program (CRP). 
The off-farm job decision is determined by comparing the potential off-farm market wage with 
the shadow value (perhaps also risk adjusted) of the farmer’s time in farm production.  
The specifications for these two equations are:    
(12)      and        r r r
r e X A P + = g g g
g e X A P + =
(13)      and      ,  r r r
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where P
r and P
g represent the reservation per acre payment, and the potential government per 
acre CRP payment; W
r and W
g represent the shadow value of the farming time and the market 
off-farm wage. The vectors Xr, Xg, Sr, and Sg are the exogenous variables, and er, eg , ur, and ug are 
the random disturbance terms. The latent binary choice variables (I1*, I2*) for the participation 
decisions of each farmer can be defined as:
4  
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The joint distribution of (e1, e2) follows a bivariate normal distribution,  , where 






















ρ ) captures the joint nature of these two decisions. Only the actual 
decisions, Ii are observed. The observation rules for these two latent variables are: Ii  = 1 (the 
farmer participates in activity i) iff   Ii* > 0; and Ii  = 0 (the farmer does not participate in activity 
i) iff   Ii* < 0 , i=1,2. The probabilities for the four regimes are (Greene 2002):   
                                                 
4 For simplicity, subscript 1 refers to the CRP decision, and subscript 2 refers to the off-farm job of the operator.  
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I I , the joint bivariate normal distribution of 
(I1,I2). The model is estimated by FIML using the log likelihood function (Greene 2002): 
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Multinomial Logit Model 
The Random Utility Model (RUM) is consistent with the maximization of utility by the 
household (McFadden 1974). Suppose utility is discrete, and each farmer (i) has j alternatives 
available.
5 The indirect utility of each alternative is: 
(17)    ij ij ij V U ε + =    i= 1..N ; j= 1.. M 
If alternative s is chosen, we assume that the indirect utility of alternative s provides farmer i 
with the highest utility, when compared to the other alternatives: 
(18)    ij ij ij is is is U V V U = + > + = ε ε  , or (18’)   ij is ij is V V ε ε > + −    s j ≠ ∀  
                                                 
5 In our case, there are four: participate in neither CRP nor off-farm work; participate in CRP only; participate in off-
farm work only; or participate in both.  
  9 The probability that farmer i chooses alternative s is:  
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Assuming a Type I extreme value error distribution (McFadden 1974), the probability of farmer i 
choosing alternative s for the multinomial logit model is: 
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The structural model can be estimated using (FIML). The log likelihood function is: 
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where d is the binary indicator for each choice; it equals one if alternative s is chosen. 
Sequential Decision Choice Structure  
  Rather than being determined simultaneously, it is possible that these two decisions are 
made sequentially. The farm household might consider one of the decisions first and makes the 
other decision sequentially depending on the first choice. Maddala (1983) suggests that it is 
important to distinguish joint and sequential decisions. Lee and Maddala (1994) have noted with 
no prior information about the decision making process, it is best to model both as a sequential 
process. We must also examine both orderings of the CRP and off-farm labor choices. 
  We categorize the sequential choice models into two families: multiple and the 
multivariate choice structures. The nested logit model fits into the first category, but it is not 
appropriate here because the characteristics of the farm households differ, but the characteristics 
of the choices available do not differ. For statistical identification, one would normalize on one 
  10of the choices, resulting in a loss of information. Instead, we adapt a bivariate probit framework 
to accommodate the sequential decision process.  
Sequential Choice Based on the Bivariate Probit Framework 
Amemiya (1985) was the pioneer in adapting the probit model to sequential choices. He 
regards the sequential decision process simply as two uncorrelated binary probit choices. Abowd 
and Farber (1982), Poirier (1980), and Tunali (1986) have proposed similar models that allow for 
correlation between sequential decisions.  
To allow for a correlation between a farmer’s decision to work off the farm and to 
participate in CRP, we propose a variation on the sequential bivariate probit model by Tunali 
(1986). We illustrate for the case where the farmer makes the off-farm job decision prior to the 
CRP choice. The CRP decision, given that the farmer has already chosen to work off the farm, 
should be regarded differently than the decision to participate in CRP, given that the farmer has 
decided not to work off the farm. The unique feature of this formulation is that it actually 
involves three choices. Each of them can be specified as a binary probit model, but they are all 
correlated. The full model is: 
(21)         1 1 1 1 ' * ε + = r z D         D1 = 1 iff D1* > 0 
   2 2 2 2 ' * ε + = r z D       D2 = 1 iff D2* > 0, conditional on D1 > 0 
   3 3 3 3 ' * ε + = r z D        D3 = 1 iff D3* > 0, conditional on D1 < 0, 
where D1* is the latent variable for the off-farm labor decision; D2* is the latent variable for the 
CRP decision, given the operator works off the farm; D3* is the latent variable for the CRP 
decision, given the operator does not work off the farm. We assume the error terms ( 3 2 1 , , ε ε ε ) 











N ; z contains the parameters 
of interest for each choice equation, and r is an individual covariate.
6 The four regimes are: 
D1=1 and D2=1; operator participates in CRP, given the choice not to work off farm; 
 
D1=1 and D2=0; operator does not participate in CRP, given a choice not to work off farm; 
 
D1=0 and D3=1; operator participates in CRP, given a choice to work off farm; and 
 
D1=0 and D3=0; operator does not participate in CRP, given a choice not to work off farm. 
 
Under the trivariate normality assumption, the probabilities of each regime are: 
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This model can be estimated by FIML using the likelihood function:
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7  
                                                 
6 Our model differs from the one proposed by Tunali (1986) in that we define two different choice structures for the 
second stage, due to the sequential nature of the choice. More specifically, the correlation between D2
* and D3
* is 
zero, since these two outcomes are mutually exclusive. Moreover, Tunali (1986) defined the case with incomplete 
classification of the observed outcomes. He studies the sequential choice of migration/re-migration process. That is: 
if people choose to stay, then there is no re-migration decision observable. The same model has been applied to the 
labor market by Henneberger and Sousa-Poza (1998). People report their wage only when they choose to work. 
Khanna (2001) applied this model to the field of agricultural economics. She studied the nitrogen productivity under 
the sequential choice for the adoption of two site-specific technologies. Our model also differs from the endogenous 
switching regression model (Lee 1978) since the second-stage equation in our model is the latent dependent variable, 
instead of the continuous one. This difference requires maximum likelihood estimation. 
  12Testing the Choice Structures and Model Selection Criteria 
To choose between the bivariate probit and multinomial logit decision structures, we use 
a non-nested test proposed by Vuong (1989) that is based on the likelihood ratio test. To test the 
nested tree structure for the sequential bivariate probit model, we use a (LDC) Likelihood 
Dominance Criterion (Pollak and Wales, 1991). See Appendix A. The independence of the IIA 
assumption in the multinomial logit model is tested using a Hausman-Wu test (Maddala, 2001).  
The Data and Empirical Specification 
The farm household data used in this paper are from the 2001 Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey (ARMS). By including much data on the farm household (e.g. non-farm 
assets, sources of non-farm income, household demographics, etc.), the ARMS database differs 
markedly from the earlier farm costs and return survey. It now provides the basis for assessing 
changes in the well being of farm households nationwide. For purposes of this study, the ARMS 
data related to off-farm income and participation in the variety of traditional farm programs and 
programs related to the environment such as CRP, CREP, and EQIP are particularly important.  
Since the objective of this paper is to understand participation in CRP and off-farm work 
by farm households, we limit our attention to the sample of farm households, and we exclude 
some large corporate operations, etc. We limit our attention to farms classified as crop farms 
because other aspects of the larger study of which this paper is a part, are designed to study the 
effects of CRP participation on farm productivity. Given the diversity of crop farming 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 Since equation (23) is highly non-linear, the selection of the initial values might be crucial for estimation. 
Therefore, the initial values of the parameters for equation (23) are determined by estimating a Heckman-Type two-
stage model. In the first stage, the standard binary probit choice model for off-farm work is estimated using 
maximum likelihood methods. Given the consistent estimators of the first stage, the second stage CRP participation 
is the conditional choice, based on the first stage off-farm decision.  Two second-stage models, using the standard 
Heckman’s error correction, provide estimates of CRP participation, conditional on the first-stage decision.  
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  13nationwide, it is already a considerable stretch to argue that there is a single production function 
for each group. The inclusion of livestock farms would compound the difficulties.  
The final sample count is 2,223, and Table 1 contains information summarizing the 
variables used in the empirical models. The frequencies of CRP participation and off-farm work 
are summarized in Table 2. About 22% of the farm households participate in CRP, and in about 
56% of them, the operator works off the farm. However, only 282 (13%) participate in both; 211 
(10%) participate only in CRP, while 960 (43%) participate only in the off-farm labor market.  
We do rely on data from additional sources. The economic characteristics of local area, 
for example, are merged into our ARMS data set. These are county-level data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) income and employment files for  2000, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, and the 1990 Census of Population, STF-3 file. Three variables representing land 
quality at the county level in which the farm is located are used. Land quality is determined as  
the product of a variable reflecting the length of the growing season and the land capability class. 
The data on the length of the growing season are those used in a global economic model 
developed to evaluate long-run agricultural and environmental sustainability (Darwin and Ingram, 
2004). The growing season variable is an estimate of the length of the rain-fed growing season. 
The land capability classes are those used by the Natural Resources Conservation Survey (NRCS) 
and elsewhere to classify land based on physical soil characteristics. The index is calculated from 
factors in the universal soil loss equation.
8
Another critical factor affecting CRP participation is the Environmental Benefits Index 
(EBI) that is calculated by Farm Service Agency (FSA) and NRCS. The EBI score in part 
                                                 
8 We owe a special thanks to Roger Claassen for making the data available. The variables are defined as:  LQH96 = 
"high" land quality = GS*(LCC1+LCC2); LQM96 = "medium" land quality = GS*(LCC3+LCC4); and LQL96 = 
"low land quality = GS*(LCC5+LCC6+LCC7+LCC8), where LCCi = percentage of land in the county that is in soil 
capability class i, and GS = the ratio of the mean rain-fed season to the mean irrigated season. 
  14determines the maximum price that can be paid for land offered into the CRP. It is assigned in 
each environmental category for each offered parcel as prescribed by the handbook that lists 
specific details on how points are to be assigned for each conservation practice and land 
characteristics.
9 It would have been ideal to have an EBI index available for each farm household 
in the ARMS data, but this was not the case. As an alternative, we use the EBI data from 
Jaroszewski, et al. (2000) and estimate an EBI for major ERS agricultural regions based on the 
percentage of land in the various conservation practices currently enrolled in CRP. By using 
these data, it is explicitly assumed that when CRP participation commitments were made, land 
was likely to be committed to these land uses in similar proportions.  
In specifying the empirical models, we are guided by the theoretical results from above, 
as well as from previous literature. As suggested by Lass, Findeis, and Hallberg (1991), it is 
convenient to think about the factors affecting participation in off-farm work in the four groups 
including: operator’s individual characteristics; farm family characteristics; farm production and 
financial characteristics; and location factors.  We also draw on the work by Goodwin and 
Mishra (2004) and El-Osta et al. (2004). Some of the factors affecting CRP participation are 
similar to those affecting the off-farm work decision. In specifying these models, we are guided 
generally by other work, such as that by Duke (2004), Suter (2004), and Park and Schorr (1997). 
Empirical Results 
Our first set of empirical results is for the statistical tests used in choosing the decision 
structure. The second is a discussion of the estimated model for preferred decision structure.  
                                                 
9 The components of EBI are: wildlife habitat, water quality benefit, reduction in wind erosion, long-term benefit 
from cover beyond the contract period, air quality benefit, conservation propriety areas enrollment, and a cost factor.  
  15Testing the Independent, Joint, and Sequential Decision Structures  
We summarize our test results about the joint and the sequential decisions in Tables 3 and 
4. Based on Vuong’s test in part A of Table 3, there is no clear preference between the bivariate 
probit model or the multinomial logit model. Although these results are inconclusive, we do 
reject the hypothesis of IIA (the independence of irrelevant alternatives) in the multinomial logit 
model according to the Hausman-Wu tests for four of the nine deleted group combinations 
involved in the test (Table 4). On this basis, there is some reason to believe that the bivariate 
probit model captures the joint nature of decisions to participate in CRP and work off the farm.  
To test the appropriateness of the sequential bivariate probit model, we begin with the 
test for the order in which the two decisions are made. The results of the LDC test suggest that 
the decision to work off the farm is made prior to the decision to participate in CRP (Part B, of 
Table 3).
10 In turn, part C of Table 3 contains the LDC test that determines the appropriateness of 
the joint decision structure against the sequential decision structure. Since the LDC test from 
above suggests that the decision to work off the farm is made prior to the decision to participate 
in CRP, it is that version of the sequential bivariate probit model that is used in this test.  Our 
result of this test supports the selection of the bivariate probit model. This reinforces our 
conclusion above that the joint decision model is better able to capture the process associated 
with decisions to participate in CRP and work off the farm working.  
This conclusion is confirmed once again by a test of this joint decision structure 
hypothesis against a null hypothesis that the two decisions are independent binary choices. This 
test involves testing the null hypothesis that the correlation coefficient between the decisions in 
the bivariate probit model is zero. The results of this test are in part D of Table 3. Based on the 
                                                 
10 LDC has been used as the model selection criterion for testing sequential structures based on a nested multinomial 
logit model framework (Kling and Thomson, 1996; Hauber and Parsons, 2000). 
  16Likelihood Ratio test, we reject the hypothesis that this correlation between these two decisions 
is zero at the 95% confidence level.  
Estimated Empirical Models 
Based on the statistical evidence that decisions to participate in CRP and work off the 
farm are determined jointly, rather than sequentially or independently, we now turn to a 
discussion of the estimated bivariate probit model.        
Determinants of CRP Participation 
Participating in CRP depends generally on some characteristics of the farm, the farm 
operator, land quality, and the circumstances in the local economy (Table 5). There are also some 
differences in participation by major ERS production region. It is clear that the probability of 
participation in CRP increases with farm size. The probability of participation is lower if the 
farm is primarily engaged in vegetable or nursery production, rather than cash grain production. 
This reflects a higher opportunity cost of land on the vegetable or nursery farms.  
In addition to the negative effect of the opportunity cost of land on participation, one 
could also hypothesize that the likelihood of participation would rise with the level of the annual 
CRP payments. Unfortunately, it is impossible to include such a variable in participation 
equations such as this because of the sample selection problem. However, Park and Schorr (1997) 
argued that the maximum bid price ought to be one of factors affecting CRP participation. We 
have no information on actual bids or bids accepted for our sample farms, but we do find that 
farm households that are located in areas where the EBI scores for land currently enrolled are 
high are more likely to participate in CRP, ceteris paribus. It is likely that in areas where the EBI 
scores were high, farmers might well expect to have higher bids accepted.  
  17Based on the measures of soil quality related to the general quality of the soil resource in 
the region described above, participation in CRP rises as the proportion of land in the 
surrounding county is classified as high or as low quality. This result suggests that CRP 
participation may be higher in areas where most of the land is well suited for agriculture, and 
lower in the areas where there is less land suitable for crop production.  
There are two variables that suggest participation in CRP has something to do with the 
life cycle of the farm operator. The likelihood of CRP participation increases with age. Thus, as 
farmers get older, committing some land to CRP may be one way of reducing operator labor 
requirements. This may also be a way of holding onto farmland assets until they are needed for 
the retirement years, or so that they can be passed on through an estate. The fact that there is a 
positive correlation between the probability of farmers working off the farm and the probability 
of participation in CRP (as measured by ρ) may also be a way of reducing operator labor 
requirements. Finally, the probability of CRP participation increases as a farmer’s education 
level increases; this is perhaps an indication that investments in human capital investment might 
lead to increases in CRP. To the extent that the investments lead to greater appreciation of the 
environmental benefits from CRP, these effects square with the theoretical model above.  
In the theory discussed above, there are also several ways in which risk can affect the 
participation in CRP. As aversion to risk increases, the likelihood of participation in a program 
where payments are certain, such as CRP, will increase. This conclusion is supported by the 
negative sign on the variable “RISK” in Table 5 (e.g. high values for “RISK” are associated with 
farmers who prefer more risk). Furthermore, by allowing for decreasing absolute risk aversion 
(DARA), our theory is also consistent with the fact that decoupled payments, “AMTA_A”, 
  18reduce the likelihood of CRP participation.
11 With DARA, farmers are likely to be less 
concerned about diversifying into risk-free income opportunities as wealth increases through 
decoupled payments.
12 Finally, since commodity program related loan deficiency payments 
(LDP) reduce farm income variability, these payments also reduce risk averse farmers’ concerns 
for allocating farm resources to programs such as CRP.
13        
Participation in other programs also affects the likelihood for CRP participation. For 
example, if the farmer is enrolled in a voluntary agricultural district, subject to a farmland 
preservation easement, is located in an agricultural protection zone or an area zoned exclusively 
for agricultural use (the variable AGDIST), the farmer is less likely to participate in CRP. Many 
farmers participate in these types of programs (most of which are state or local programs) out of 
concern for maintaining their land in agricultural production in rapidly growing areas where 
there is competition for land for non-agricultural purposes. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that, 
ceteris paribus, these farmers would be less likely to enroll land in a program such as CRP that 
essentially takes land out of production. The fact that the likelihood of CRP participation falls as 
the proportion of population that is urban rises would seem to reinforce this explanation.
14 In 
contrast, farmers who participate in EQIP are also more likely to participate in CRP. 
Participation in both EQIP and CRP could reflect a farmer’s stewardship for the environment 
                                                 
11 We know that if one assumes a negative exponential utility that embodies the assumption of constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA), a change in farm household wealth is independent of the farm household’s production decisions. 
Limits on the length of this paper prevent us from developing our theoretical results regarding risk in detail. 
However, elsewhere we develop a more general risk formulation where we assume instead that the utility function 
can be approximated by a second-order Taylor series expansion about the mean (Kumbhakar, 2002 and Isik, 2002). 
Accordingly, we make no specific assumptions about the utility function, or about the distribution of the random 
variable.  We develop comparative static results showing that CRP participation is affected by a change in wealth 
associated with decoupled payments under decreasing absolute risk aversion  (Chang and Boisvert, 2005).   
12 By assuming non-constant absolute risk aversion, Hennessey’s (1998) framework is also consistent with our 
results in the sense that he shows that under these conditions, decoupled payments can affect crop production 
alternatives.     
13 In a simpler model of just the CRP choice, the null hypotheses that decoupled payments, loan deficiency 
payments, participation in EQIP and in local agricultural districts, etc. are exogenous to the decision to participate in 
CRP could not be rejected.   
14 Duke (2004) also found that the likelihood of participation in CRP is lower in highly urban areas.   
  19(reflected in our theoretical model) by removing venerable land from production, while also 
using more environmentally friendly practices on land still in production. 
Determinants of the Off-Farm Work Decision 
  As expected, the decision of the farm operator to engage in off-farm work also depends 
on characteristics of the farm, the farm operator, and the circumstances in the local economy. As 
in much of the existing literature (e.g. Sumner 1982; Benjamin and Guyomard 1994; Abdulai 
and Delgado 1999), our results continue to confirm the fact that older farmers are more likely to 
work off the farm.
15 However, the effect is nonlinear, with the likelihood of participation 
increasing with the operator’s age up to about age 44, but declining thereafter. Although the 
operator’s education has a positive effect on the probability of participation in off-farm work, the 
years of experience on the farm has a negative effect that increases at an increasing rate. Farm 
operators raised on farms are also less likely to work off the farm. Since returns to off-farm labor 
are likely to be less variable than farm returns, the indication that the likelihood of off-farm 
participation is lower for farm operators willing to accept more risk (a negative coefficient on 
“RISK” in Table 3, a variable that increases as a farmer is willing to accept more risk) is 
consistent with the theory of risk averse behavior, but the effect is not statistically significant.  
The likelihood of working off the farm decreases with family size, but increases if the 
spouse is primarily a homemaker. This latter result may not square with the fact that the 
operator’s likelihood of working off the farm increases with the spouse working off the farm. To 
disentangle these results, we might well have to specify the characteristics of household size in 
greater detail and deal with the fact that the decision of the spouse to work off the farm may be 
endogenous. Attempts will be made to disentangle these effects in subsequent analyses.  
                                                 
15 Our result is not consistent with Whittaker and Ahearn (1991), who found that young operators were more likely 
than older operators to work off the farm. 
  20The likelihood of participation in off-farm work declines with farm size and farm tenancy, 
as measured by the proportion of land owned, and it is lower for vegetable or nursery operations. 
The negative effects on the likelihood of participation of both net worth and participation in 
government programs other than CRP may reflect wealth or scale effects on off-farm labor 
supply (Goodwin and Mishra, 2004). The negative effect of tenancy on the likelihood for off-
farm job participation reflects a greater commitment to agricultural production (ceteris paribus) 
from operators that own their own land. Finally, there is some indication that the strength of the 
local economy, as measured by the proportion of jobs that are manufacturing, increases the 
likelihood of participation in off-farm work. The extent to which the local economy depends on 
jobs in the trade sectors reduces the likelihood of participation in off-farm work.  
Concluding Remarks 
This paper investigates the extent to which decisions by farm households to participate in 
CRP and to off-farm work are made independently, are simultaneous, or are determined 
sequentially. We compare two major econometric approaches that are consistent with a 
simultaneous decision hypothesis, the multinomial logit and bivariate probit models, with an 
appropriate variation in a sequential bivariate probit model. In so doing, we eliminate the need to 
normalize on one of the choices as would be the case if we were to use a nested logit model for 
the sequential choice.  
Based on estimated models for sequential choice and the two simultaneous choice 
specifications, the empirical results suggest that the decisions to work off the farm are not made 
independently from decisions to participate in CRP. If we focus on the sequential choice model, 
we find that households seem to make off-farm work decisions prior to decisions to participate in 
CRP. However, in terms of the simultaneous choice models, results also show that the bivariate 
  21probit model performs better than the multinomial logit model, particularly since we reject the 
IIA hypothesis embodied in the multinomial logit. Since the correlation coefficient between these 
two decisions is 12% and is statistical significant, there is evidence that these two decisions are 
made simultaneously. Support is also found for the simultaneous decision specification from the 
results of the LDC tests applied to the bivariate and sequential probit models.  
These results all seem to support a joint decision structure, but since the analysis is based 
on cross sectional data, it is difficult to know how the results might have changed had we had 
access to panel data containing information about the actual timing of these two decisions. What 
is perhaps clear from the analysis is that these two decisions are not made independently, a 
finding that should have important policy significance.   
Focusing on the preferred bivariate probit specification, there are common factors that 
affect both decisions. Older farm operators with more education are more likely to work off the 
farm and participate in CRP, as are farmers who are more risk averse. Furthermore, operators of 
larger farms are less likely to participate in an off-farm job, but more likely to be in CRP. Not 
surprisingly, households participating in other environmentally related programs are more likely 
to participate in CRP.  However, those farmers enrolled in state or local agricultural districts or 
participate in other local farmland retention programs are less likely to participate in CRP.  
Factors that affect only the likelihood of off-farm employment include tenancy, working status of 
the spouse, household size, and farming experience. 
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  26Appendix A 
Testing the Choice Structures and Model Selection Criteria 
Model Selection Criterion between Two Joint (non-sequential) Decision Models 
To choose between the bivariate probit and multinomial logit decision structures, we use 
a non-nested test proposed by Vuong (1989) that is based on the likelihood ratio test. Given 
likelihood functions ) , | ( α i i r y f  and ) , | ( θ i i z y g corresponding to bivariate probit and 
multinomial logit models, respectively, we estimate the variance of the difference between the 
two likelihood functions, defined as: 
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E , then there is no basis on which to prefer one model to the other. Under 
this null hypothesis that there is no difference, Vuong derived the test statistics as: 
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E , then the 
multinomial logit model is preferred to the bivariate probit model.  
Although the multinomial logit model is used commonly by empirical economists in 
studying individual choices among different alternatives, the model implicitly has the property of 
the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Under IIA, the introduction of an alternative 
will not change the log odds-ratio between any pair of the existing choices. This assumption is 
  27thought to be a weakness of the model; therefore, we test the IIA property of the multinomial 
logit model using a standard Hausman-Wu test (e.g. Maddala, 2001). If the IIA property is 
rejected, this model specification might not appropriate for our choice situation.    
Test of the Nested Tree Structure for the Sequential Bivariate Probit Model 
To test the nested tree structure for the sequential bivariate probit model, we utilize the 
“Likelihood Dominance Criterion” (LDC) proposed by Pollak and Wales (1991). After using 
maximum likelihood methods to estimate models under each of the two assumptions about 
which choice is made first, the comparison is based on the log likelihood values and the number 
of the parameters in each model (e.g. Kling and Thomson, 1996). With no prior information, we 
must test the hypothesis: 
      H0: CRP participation decision is made prior to the decision to work off the farm. 
H1: Off-farm working decision is made first before the CRP decision. 
The model selection criterion under the LDC test is (Pollak and Wales, 1991, p. 236): 
(i)   LDC prefers H0 to H1   if     L1-L0< [X (n1+1)-X (n0+1)]/2 
(ii)  LDC is indecisive if  [X (n1- n0+1)- X (1)]/2 >L1-L0>[X (n1+1)-X (n0+1)]/2  
(iii) LDC prefers H1 to H0   if     L1-L0 > [X (n1- n0 +1) - X (1)]/2  
where L1, L0 are the log likelihood values, and n1, n0 are the numbers of the parameters in the two 
models, respectively. X (k) is the chi-square critical value with the degree of freedom of k for a 
95% confidence interval.  
 
  28Table 1: Summary Statistics Crop Farms in the ARMS Data, 2001, Sample of 2223
Variable Names Variable Definitions Mean  Std.
OP Operator working off farm (=1) 0.56 0.50
CRP_CREP Enrolled in CRP or CREP (=1) 0.22 0.42
HOUR_OP Operators annual hours off farm  1980 842
URBAN Percentage of labor market area’s population living in urban areas 56.45 21.78
MANUF LMA’s employment in manufacturing (%) 13.94 6.87
TRADE LMA’s employment in wholesale and retail trade (%) 20.32 2.35
LQH_96 Proportion of high quality land of 1996 0.33 0.25
LQL_96 Proportion of low quality land of 1996 0.23 0.19
EQIP Participate in EQIP (=1) 0.0030 0.0543
SP Spouse working off farm (=1) 0.53 0.50
AGDIST Participates in local agricultural preservation program (=1) 0.05 0.22
REGN1 ERS region 1(Heartland) (=1) 0.29 0.45
REGN3 ERS region 3 (Northern Great Plains) (=1) 0.07 0.26
REGN567 ERS region 5 (Eastern Uplands), 6 (Southern Seaboard), 7 (Fruitful Rim) 
(=1) 0.29 0.46
REGN9 ERS region 9 (Mississippi Portal) (=1) 0.05 0.22
H_SIZE Number of household members 2.75 1.27
OP_ED_C Education level of the operator (year) 13.04 2.43
CROP17 Cash grain farm, (=1) 0.70 0.46
CROP456 Vegetable, fruit, or nursery farm, (=1) 0.21 0.41
NETWORT1 Household networth value divided by 100,000 4.61 15.70
SP_HMAK Spouse is a home maker (=1) 0.25 0.43
TENANCY Owned acreage divided by total acreage   0.95 2.08
AMTA_A Per acre AMTA payment  5.50 12.65
LDP_A Per acre LDP payment 8.35 18.72
OP_AGE Age of the operator 54.59 13.78
LP_CRP_C Logrithm of the per acre CRP payment  3.99 0.71
LGWAGEOP Logrithm of the opearator's off-farm job wage 2.83 0.74
OP_EXP Years of the operator working on farm job 25.50 63.00
RISK Risk preference operator; 0 if risk averse, 10 if risk loving 4.48 2.43
RAISE_OP Operator was raised on the farm (=1) 0.79 0.41
CROPSIZ1 Operated acreage divided by 1,000 0.32 0.68
A_CRP_C Acre enrollment in CRP and CREP  150.32 305.22
EBI Environmental benefits index 61.64 3.87
* Note: All variables are weighted by the full sample weights; the sample size is 2,223
  29Table 2: Distribution of the Joint Choice
OP 01 T o t a
0 770 211 981
% 34.64 9.49 44.13
1 960 282 1242
% 43.18 12.69 55.87
Total 1730 493 2223
% 77.82 22.18
Weighted with full sample weights.
CRP 
l
Table 3: Model Selection Criterion Between Models
Difference in  Difference  Test  Critical  Model 
Log Likelihood in Para # Value Value Selection
A. Joint Decision Models No 
BVP vs MNL* -- -- -1.6309 -1.69 Preference
B. Sequential Decision Models
Sequential BVP**
OP vs CRP 8.51 3 -- 2.83 OP
C. Joint vs Sequential Choices
Sequential BVP vs BVP** -19 18 -- 10.53 BVP
D. Joint vs Independent Choices***
BVP vs (CRP&OP) 7.126 3.84 BVP
Note: *: Vuong Test; **: LDC Test; ***: LR Test OP (CRP) is where off-farm (CRP) decision is made first.
Table 4: IIA Test for the M L Model 
Deleted Group (x
2)
group 3 only 4
group 1 only 3
group 0 only 162
group 2 and 3 9
group 1 and 2 18
group 1 and 3 3
group 3 and 0 129
group 2 and 0 93
group 1 and 0 130
Critical value is 41.33; * is rejected at 95% level
group 0: nonparticipants; group 1: CRP=1 only
group 2: OP=1 only; group3: CRP=OP=1  
  30Table 5:  Bivariate Probit Model Estimation
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std P Value
Constant -4.948 1.414 -3.499 0.001
OP_AGE 0.029 0.003 9.405 0.000
OP_ED_C 0.073 0.016 4.621 0.000
LQH_96 0.544 0.212 2.568 0.010
LQL_96 -1.072 0.327 -3.283 0.001
EQIP 1.130 0.409 2.762 0.006
AGDIST -1.163 0.266 -4.375 0.000
EBI 0.047 0.021 2.184 0.029
AMTA_A -0.030 0.005 -6.331 0.000
LDP_A -0.014 0.003 -5.057 0.000
RISK -0.057 0.018 -3.195 0.001
CROP456 -1.921 0.265 -7.236 0.000
CROPSIZ1 0.232 0.040 5.732 0.000
REGN1 0.164 0.105 1.562 0.118
REGN567 -0.386 0.144 -2.679 0.007
REGN9 1.247 0.266 4.688 0.000
URBAN -0.014 0.002 -7.905 0.000
Constant -0.928 0.585 -1.586 0.113
OP_AGE 0.139 0.017 8.401 0.000
OP_AGESQ -1.633 0.147 -11.088 0.000
OP_ED_C 0.060 0.014 4.269 0.000
OP_EXP -0.018 0.004 -4.983 0.000
OP_EXPSQ 0.000 0.000 4.899 0.000
H_SIZE -0.087 0.030 -2.925 0.003
CROPSIZ1 -0.597 0.032 -18.682 0.000
RAISE_OP -0.452 0.097 -4.645 0.000
MANUF 0.020 0.006 3.614 0.000
TRADE -0.041 0.015 -2.840 0.005
AMTA_A -0.007 0.002 -3.035 0.002
LDP_A -0.003 0.001 -1.908 0.056
RISK -0.017 0.014 -1.185 0.236
NETWORT1 -0.003 0.004 -0.879 0.380
SP_HMAK 0.250 0.073 3.415 0.001
CROP456 -0.878 0.094 -9.356 0.000
REGN3 0.287 0.132 2.170 0.030
REGN567 -0.214 0.076 -2.795 0.005
TENANCY -0.043 0.023 -1.886 0.059
RHO 0.121 0.053 2.292 0.022
Log-likelihood -1872 LR test* 7.126
* The null hypothesis for LR test is: RHO=0, critical value of x
2 (0.95,1) is 3.84
Correlation Coefficient
Estimation for CRP Equation
Estimation for OP Equation
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